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dc.contributor.authorOcampo, Melina
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-18T15:50:41Z
dc.date.available2015-12-18T15:50:41Z
dc.date.created2014-06-30
dc.identifierhttp://revistas.udem.edu.co/index.php/Ciencias_Sociales/article/view/940spa
dc.identifier.issn2256-5000
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11407/1558
dc.descriptionCon el fin de determinar las causas por las cuales una persona ingresa a un grupo armado ilegal en Antioquia, se revisó la literatura existente tanto en el ámbito internacional como en el nacional. La misma se contrastó con la información cuantitativa existente de los victimarios y exvictimarios en los órdenes nacional y departamental, y la información cualitativa encontrada en entrevistas a miembros de bandas criminales y en grupos focales con expertos.  Un sujeto puede tener motivaciones para delinquir basadas en la coerción, los deseos individuales, los incentivos selectivos, los entornos sociales y familiares, los agravios, la falta de control social, y en unas características o rasgos personales que lo pueden hacer más propenso a realizar actividades delictivas. Su continuidad en un grupo armado dependerá de las estrategias de enganche que pueden consistir en la incriminación, las prebendas económicas, el discurso ideológico, o en amenazas. Luego de un proceso de desmovilización, otros factores como la inseguridad personal, la falta de influencia política, la ausencia de prestigio social, la inseguridad económica y otras fallas específicas del proceso de reintegración a la sociedad pueden influir en la reincidencia en actividades criminales.En Antioquia, la coerción como estrategia de reclutamiento continúa siendo utilizada; las motivaciones fundamentadas en los entornos sociales se observaron como esenciales y comunes para bandas criminales y guerrilla; los deseos individuales enfocados en el interés por una vida militar estuvieron más relacionados con la guerrilla, y los sentimientos codiciosos se asociaron más con las bandas criminales; los incentivos selectivos a través de las promesas de salario fueron propios de las bandas criminales; y por último, los agravios, que son soporte ideológico propio de la guerrilla, son también usados por las bandas criminales como estrategia de reclutamiento y de búsqueda de legitimidad en los territorios en los que buscan consolidarse.spa
dc.descriptionWith the purpose of determining the causes by which a person becomes a mem­ber of an illegal armed group in Antioquia, existing national and international litera­ture was reviewed. This literature was compared to the quantitative information related to perpetrators and former perpe­trators in the country and in the State, and the qualitative information found in inter­views made to members of criminal bands and focal groups with experts.An individual can have good reasons to commit crimes based on coercion, indi­vidual wishes, selective incentives, social and family environments, damages, lack of social control, and on several personal characteristics or traits which may make of him more prone to commit criminal activi­ties. His continuation in an armed group will depend on the recruitment strategies that can involve incrimination, economic benefits, ideological speech or threats. Af­ter a demobilization process, other factors such as personal insecurity, lack of politi­cal influence, absence of social prestige, economic insecurity, and other specific failures of the process of reintegration to society may result in the person’s new per­petration of criminal activities.In Antioquia, coercion as a recruitment strategy is still a frequently used method; basic motivations in social environments were observed as essential and common for criminal bands and guerrilla groups; individual intention focused on the inter­est for a military life were more related to guerrilla and avaricious feelings were much more associated to criminal bands; selective incentives after promising a salary were factors related to criminal bands; finally, damages, that are an ideo­logical support of guerrilla groups are also used by criminal bands as a strategy for recruitment and a search for legitimacy within the territories where consolidation is sought.spa
dc.format.mediumElectrónicospa
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad de Medellínspa
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCiencias Sociales y Educación; Vol. 3, núm. 5 (2014)spa
dc.relation.haspartCiencias Sociales y Educación; Vol. 3, núm. 5 - enero/junio 2014spa
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/*
dc.sourceCiencias Sociales y Educación; Vol. 3, núm. 5 (2014)spa
dc.subjectarmed groupsspa
dc.subjectperpetratorsspa
dc.subjectmotivationsspa
dc.subjectrecruitmentspa
dc.subjectdemobilizationspa
dc.subjectreintegrationspa
dc.subjectprofilesspa
dc.subjectguerrillaspa
dc.subjectcriminal bandsspa
dc.subjectgrupos armadosspa
dc.subjectvictimariosspa
dc.subjectmotivacionesspa
dc.subjectreclutamientospa
dc.subjectdesmovilizaciónspa
dc.subjectreintegraciónspa
dc.subjectperfilesspa
dc.subjectguerrillaspa
dc.subjectbandas criminalesspa
dc.titleCriminalidad, grupos armados y reinserción: perfiles y motivacionesspa
dc.typeArticleeng
dc.rights.accessrightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.contributor.affiliationOcampo, Melina; Gobernación de Antioquia
dc.relation.citationvolume3
dc.relation.citationissue5
dc.audienceComunidad Universidad de Medellínspa
dc.publisher.facultyDepartamento de Ciencias Sociales y Humanasspa
dc.coverageLat: 06 15 00 N  degrees minutes  Lat: 6.2500  decimal degreesLong: 075 36 00 W  degrees minutes  Long: -75.6000  decimal degreesspa
dc.publisher.placeMedellínspa
dc.title.alternativeesCriminality, Armed Groups, and Reinsertion: Profiles and Motivationsspa
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dc.rights.creativecommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International*
dc.identifier.eissn2590-7344
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.localArtículo científicospa
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad de Medellínspa
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repository.udem.edu.co/
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Universidad de Medellínspa


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