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Comercio mundial y conflicto nacional: enfoque estratégico de la política comercial desde la teoría de juegos

Global trade and national conflict: a strategic approach to trade policy based on game theory;
Comércio global e conflito nacional: uma abordagem estratégica da política comercial baseada na teoria dos jogos

dc.contributor.authorContreras, José
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-03T14:35:33Z
dc.date.available2024-07-03T14:35:33Z
dc.date.created2024-04-22
dc.identifier.issn0120-6346
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11407/8373
dc.descriptionLa apertura comercial ha sido un instrumento de desarrollo de los países. El objetivo de la investigación es mostrar, en primer lugar, que la apertura comercial genera, en el largo plazo, efectos distributivos que inducen conflictos internos en los países. En segundo lugar, las economías de escala y los incrementos de productividad llevan a conflictos entre países por la guerra que se genera al intentar mantener o ganar participación en los mercados internacionales. Los resultados se obtienen a partir de los teoremas de Stolper-Samuelson para los efectos internos y las funciones de participación para visualizar los conflictos entre países. En tercer lugar, se estructuran y analizan los equilibrios de Nash que resultan de modelar diversos esquemas de política comercial en un enfoque estratégico. Por último, se concluye que los países pueden mejorar los resultados provenientes del comercio internacional si aplican esquemas de política comercial estratégica que considere las posibles acciones de sus oponentes desde un esquema de la teoría de juegos.spa
dc.descriptionTrade liberalization has been a tool for country development. This research aimed to show, firstly, that trade liberalization generates, in the long run, distributive effects inducing internal conflicts within countries. Secondly, economies of scale and productivity increases lead to conflicts between countries due to the competition generated by attempts to maintain or gain market share in international markets. The results are derived from the Stolper-Samuelson theorems for internal effects and participation functions to visualize conflicts between countries. Thirdly, Nash equilibria resulting from modeling various trade policy schemes following a strategic approach are structured and analyzed. Finally, it is concluded that countries can improve outcomes from international trade if they apply strategic trade policy schemes that make room for potential actions of their opponents within a game theory framework.eng
dc.descriptionA liberalização do comércio tem sido uma ferramenta para o desenvolvimento dos países. Esta pesquisa teve como objetivo mostrar, em primeiro lugar, que a liberalização do comércio gera, a longo prazo, efeitos distributivos que induzem a conflitos internos nos países. Em segundo lugar, as economías de escala e os aumentos de produtividade levam a conflitos entre países devido à concorrência gerada pelas tentativas de manter ou ganhar participação nos mercados internacionais. Os resultados são derivados dos teoremas de Stolper-Samuelson para efeitos internos e funções de participação para visualizar conflitos entre países. Em terceiro lugar, os equilíbrios de Nash resultantes da modelagem de vários esquemas de política comercial seguindo uma abordagem estratégica são estruturados e analisados. Por fim, conclui-se que os países podem melhorar os resultados do comércio internacional se aplicarem esquemas estratégicos de política comercial que abram espaço para possíveis ações de seus oponentes dentro de uma estrutura de teoria dos jogos.por
dc.formatPDF
dc.format.extentp. 1-37
dc.format.mediumElectrónico
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad de Medellín
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSemestre Económico; Vol. 27 No. 62 (2024)
dc.relation.haspartSemestre Económico; Vol. 27 Núm. 62 enero-junio 2024
dc.relation.urihttps://revistas.udem.edu.co/index.php/economico/article/view/4525
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0*
dc.sourceSemestre Económico; Vol. 27 No. 62 (2024): (enero-junio); 1-37
dc.subjectApertura comercialspa
dc.subjectEfectos distributivosspa
dc.subjectPolítica comercial estratégicaspa
dc.subjectEquilibrios de Nashspa
dc.subjectTrade liberalizationeng
dc.subjectDistributive effectseng
dc.subjectStrategic trade policyeng
dc.subjectNash equilibriaeng
dc.subjectLiberalização do comérciopor
dc.subjectEfeitos distributivospor
dc.subjectPolítica comercial estratégicapor
dc.subjectEquilíbrios de Nashpor
dc.titleComercio mundial y conflicto nacional: enfoque estratégico de la política comercial desde la teoría de juegosspa
dc.titleGlobal trade and national conflict: a strategic approach to trade policy based on game theoryeng
dc.titleComércio global e conflito nacional: uma abordagem estratégica da política comercial baseada na teoria dos jogospor
dc.typearticle
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.22395/seec.v27n62a4525
dc.relation.citationvolume27
dc.relation.citationissue62
dc.relation.citationstartpage1
dc.relation.citationendpage37
dc.audienceComunidad Universidad de Medellínspa
dc.publisher.facultyFacultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativasspa
dc.coverageLat: 06 15 00 N degrees minutes Lat: 6.2500 decimal degreesLong: 075 36 00 W degrees minutes Long: -75.6000 decimal degrees
dc.publisher.placeMedellín
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dc.rights.creativecommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International*
dc.identifier.eissn2248-4345
dc.type.coarhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.localArtículo científico
dc.type.driverinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.identifier.reponamereponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad de Medellín
dc.identifier.repourlrepourl:https://repository.udem.edu.co/
dc.identifier.instnameinstname:Universidad de Medellín


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